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1. New challenges confronting the law of the sea
F
or centuries, the maritime order governing the world’s oceans, which cover 70% of the 
earth’s surface, consisted of a dual structure, divided between the narrow bands of 
territorial waters deemed necessary for the security of coastal states and the vast high 
seas beyond, which all countries were free to navigate and use as they saw t. The law 
of the sea, which codies this order, is one of the oldest elds of international law.
Freedom of navigation on the high seas for maritime trades was understood to be in the 
general interest of international community. Accordingly, the pirates who threatened this common 
good were regarded as “enemies of mankind” (hostis humani generis). As early as the seventeenth 
century, piracy was dened as an offense of “universal jurisdiction,” punishable at the discretion 
of each state. More recently, however, international human rights law, which has developed 
signicantly after World War II, has taken a stand on the enforcement of anti-piracy laws, calling 
for suspects to be brought before a judge within 48 hours of the initial detention where possible. 
In this way, one of the classic problems addressed by the law of the sea has emerged as a new 
human rights challenge.
Migration issues have led to similar tensions. The law of the sea imposes on ships of all 
nations a duty to rescue, if possible, any persons in distress whom they encounter at sea. This 
naturally includes the obligation to transport the distressed persons to a safe place. However, 
in recent times, a growing number of states have been evading their responsibility to protect 
distressed persons if they were found to be undocumented migrants or refugees on overcrowded 
boats. They do this by barring the entry of rescue ships into their territorial waters. The reason is 
that, once migrants enter a country’s territorial water, they fall within the scope of the Convention 
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Relating to the Status of Refugees, which requires contracting states to provide migrants with 
refugee hearings and prohibits them from returning refugees to a country in which they could 
face persecution (the principle of non-refoulement). With the law of the sea calling for rescue 
and protection of persons in distress, and international human rights law demanding that the 
distressed persons’ rights be upheld, these states are responding by attempting to limit the spatial 
scope of their duty to protect human life (to their own territories, including territorial waters), 
bringing them into conflict with protection of the human rights of the individual. Underlying 
many of these new, twenty-rst-century challenges, from the Somali piracy crisis to the ood of 
refugees from regions destabilized for a long time by the so-called Islamic State, is the failure 
of national governments̶entrusted with safeguarding the lives, persons, and property of the 
people̶to exercise effective control over their own territories.
2. UNCLOS and its elaboration via case law
Similar tensions surround the exploitation of marine resources in the East and South China Seas. 
The Chinese government, having embraced the goal of becoming a “great maritime power,” is 
determined not only to become a major naval power but also to secure their maritime interests. 
Having become the world’s second largest economy, China needs marine resources to support 
its economic development. One focus of this drive is the East China Sea, where China and 
Japan have yet to agree on the delimitation between their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and 
continental shelves. Despite the absence of an agreement, China has unilaterally pushed ahead 
with development of gas elds in a section of the East China Sea that lies on the Chinese side of 
the median line proposed under Japan’s Act on Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. 
As of this writing, Japan has conrmed the presence of 16 drilling structures in that area.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that the delimitation of the 
EEZ and the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts “shall be effected 
by agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable solution” 
(Article 74, paragraph 1 and Article 83, paragraph 1). It also requires that parties to a dispute 
exercise restraint, stipulating that “pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the 
states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter 
into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the nal agreement” (Article 74, paragraph 3 and Article 83, 
paragraph 3). In August 2006, before embarking on its unilateral gas exploration and development 
program in the East China Sea, China lodged a declaration with the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, stating that it would not accept the compulsory arbitration process provided for 
in Part XV of the Convention, Settlement of Disputes, to disputes relating to interpretation or 
application of the provisions in Article 74 and Article 83. In the Guyana-Suriname case awarded 
on September 17, 2007, under that same arbitration process, the court ruled that unilateral 
exploitation of oil and gas reserves in an undelimited maritime area constituted an action to 
“jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the nal agreement” as well as a breach of the obligation to 
exercise restraint. In the light of this award, it seems clear that China’s current activity in the East 
China Sea is in violation of UNCLOS.
In January 2013, the Philippines, making use of the aforesaid compulsory arbitration, brought 
a case against China, known as the South China Sea arbitration. Recognizing that China had opted 
out of arbitration on delimitation disputes, the Philippines did not seek a decision establishing the 
maritime boundary but instead brought an “entitlement dispute.” Specically, it challenged the 
legality of China’s “nine-dash line” on the grounds that the reefs and low-tide elevations, including 
the Spratly Islands, over which China exercised de facto administrative control could not by 
denition have their own territorial waters, EEZs or continental shelves. This approach overcame 
jurisdictional obstacles, and on July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled that China has no 
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historical right based on the nine-dash line and was in violation of UNCLOS. In the same case, the 
arbitral tribunal took on the interpretation of Article 121, which deals with the legal denition of 
an island. Whether or not one agrees with the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation, it does clarify the 
provision, which had previously been criticized as “intolerably imprecise” and “a perfect recipe for 
confusion and conict.” In this way, the judicial process is gradually developing and eshing out 
the normative content of UNCLOS.
3. Biodiversity and sustainable use of resources beyond national jurisdiction
As a “living treaty,” UNCLOS also develops and evolves its content through various implementing 
agreements elaborated in response to new issues and challenges.
The first UNCLOS “implementing agreement” was the 1994 Agreement Relating to 
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, which established the International Seabed 
Authority. The second was the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which elaborated on the 
UNCLOS principle of adopting a precautionary approach to the management of straddling and 
highly migratory sh stocks, embraced an ecosystem approach to management of those stocks 
(whose habitats span the articial boundaries of the 200-mile EEZ), and introduced consistent 
conservation and management measures straddling in the EEZ and on the high seas. In addition, 
an intergovernmental conference established to negotiate a new UNCLOS implementing 
agreement was convened in the United Nations in September 2018.
Despite these developments in the twentieth century, the twenty-rst century has witnessed 
the emergence of challenges that the drafters of UNCLOS never anticipated. One is the 
exploitation of marine genetic resources (MGRs). Another is the establishment of marine 
protected areas (MPAs).
At present, only a limited number of industrially advanced nations have access to marine 
genetic resources and entities capable of utilizing them. This has raised concerns among 
developing countries that the principle of freedom of the high seas will be applied to the 
exploitation and utilization of MGRs. The developing countries note that the ocean oor and its 
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction are considered part of the common heritage of 
humankind, and they argue that the same should apply to marine organisms dwelling in those 
areas. Accordingly, they argue that, since MGRs from the deep seabed are the common heritage 
of humankind, any benefits from their use should be distributed fairly and equitably among 
members of the international community.
Marine protected areas are not defined under the provisions of UNCLOS. Amid a growing 
need for steps to protect the marine environment and its biodiversity, individual countries have 
been taking steps to establish MPAs within their own territorial waters and EEZs, with each 
country establishing its own denition and regulatory regime in accordance with domestic law. 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity incorporates the concept of protected areas to 
achieve its objectives, which include not only the conservation of biological diversity but also 
the “sustainable use of its components” (Article 1). The International Union for Conservation 
of Nature has established various categories of protected area, classified according to their 
management objectives, and it mentions “ecosystem services” in its definition of MPAs. Japan 
is promoting its own type of MPA that would maximize the potential role of ecosystem services, 
with the aim of both protecting and utilizing biological diversity.
On June 19, 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (69/292) on “development of 
an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.” It calls for international 
negotiations to address, together and as a whole, marine genetic resources, including the sharing 
of benefits; area-based management tools, including marine protected areas; environmental 
impact assessments; and capacity building and transfer of marine technology. Thus the UN 
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campaign began to put together an international agreement on marine biological diversity beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction, or BBNJ. The effort began with the formation of a preparatory 
committee, which met four times between March 2016 and July 2017.
In the “non-paper on elements of a draft text” issued at the nal meeting of the preparatory 
committee, the committee chair offered an extensive compilation of ideas, proposals, and options 
for a new agreement, including a host of matters on which the delegations had failed to reach any 
consensus. For example, with respect to the scope of the instrument, there was disagreement as 
to whether it should encompass just the seabed beyond national jurisdiction or both the seabed 
and high seas and whether it should apply only to in-situ MGRs (in their original habitat) or also 
to ex-situ resources (such as genetic material stored in gene banks and laboratories) and even 
in-silico resources (such as information in databases and resources created through computer 
simulations). Even more basically, opinion remains sharply divided as to whether the governing 
principle should be freedom of the high seas or the common heritage of humankind.
The rst session of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on BBNJ was held on September 
4–17, 2018. At that time it was decided that three more sessions would be held by the rst half of 
2020. Prior to the rst session, an organizational meeting was held in New York on April 16–18, 
2018. Among the top agenda items at this initial meeting was the election of a president. The post 
went to Rena Lee of Singapore, Ambassador for Oceans and Law of the Sea Issues and Special 
Envoy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had served as facilitator for capacity building and 
technology transfer on the preparatory committee. The delegates also exchanged views on the 
best way to structure the IGC’s deliberations, scheduled to begin the following September. It was 
agreed that the president would draft an “aid to discussions” paper in preparation for the first 
session to serve as a starting point for deliberations, but that she would not prepare a “zero draft,” 
which might have the effect of rushing the negotiations. President Lee subsequently prepared 
and submitted the President’s Aid to Discussions (A/CONF.232/2018/3).
Will the international community embark on a major restructuring of the existing maritime 
order, embracing the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ as a new common goal of that 
order? Or will it rally around a solution that upholds the existing order, in accordance with the 
UN resolution on BBNJ (72/249) adopted on December 24, 2017, which “reafrms that the work 
and results of the conference should be fully consistent with the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea”? Only time will tell.
As the foundation of the maritime order, UNCLOS has taken the approach of dividing the 
oceans into discrete zones to determine the rights and obligations of coastal and inland states 
vis-à-vis those waters. It has also created separate regulatory regimes governing navigation, 
shing, resource development, marine conservation, and scientic research. On the high seas, 
enforcement of regulations follows the ag state doctrine. Yet UNCLOS itself afrms the need 
for unied regulation in its preamble, which states that “the problems of ocean space are closely 
interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.” It was the inability of regional fishery 
authorities to control illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas that 
led to the conclusion of the Agreement on Port State Measures, which expanded port states’ 
jurisdiction over foreign vessels engaged in illegal shing. Here we see a new attempt to unify 
international marine regulation through a coordinated effort to keep illegally caught sh off the 
market.
As the IGC proceeds, it will bear close watching to see how the pursuit of new common goals, 
namely, the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity, impacts the framework for 
separate regulatory regimes and how the existing maritime order is restructured as a result.
